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# An Attribute-Based Events Model for Collective Adaptive Systems


based on joint work with M. Pasqua (U. Verona), M. Paier (IMT Lucca), and others

February 2, 2024


Marino Miculan

[marino.miculan@uniud.it](mailto:marino.miculan@uniud.it)





Theory Days at Randivälja




State-based ECA rules: “**on** movement **if** alarm = "active" **then** siren ← on”  
 variables can be internal, or connected to sensors or to actuators




State-based ECA rules: “**on** movement **if** alarm = "active" **then** siren ← on”  
 variables can be internal, or connected to sensors or to actuators

- Centralized
- No intra-nodes communication
- Cloud-dependent
- Very popular as Trigger-Action Platforms (TAP):    



- Fully distributed
- Communication between nodes
- Cloud-agnostic
- Identity decoupled, for scalability
- *Collective Adaptive Systems*





We need programming abstractions and models for edge computing with:

- peer-to-peer, decentralised control
- identity decoupling, for scalability (no point-to-point communication)
- open and flexible (nodes can join and leave dynamically)
- which integrate neatly within the ECA paradigm

Nodes behavior: defined by **ECA rules** like “on  $z$  for all  $\Pi : x \leftarrow e$ ”

Nodes state: **local memory**

Interaction: **remote updates**



**Attribute-based interaction:** on all nodes satisfying  $\Pi$ , update the remote  $x$  with  $e$

- An **AbU system**  $S$  is an **AbU node**  $R, \iota \langle \Sigma, \Theta \rangle$  or the parallel of systems  $S_1 \parallel S_2$
- Each node is equipped with a list  $R$  of **AbU rules** and an **invariant**  $\iota$  specifying *admissible* states




“on all nodes with (remote)  $x$  greater than the current (local)  $x$ ”

**for all:**  $@(x < \bar{x}) : \bar{x} \leftarrow x, \bar{y} \leftarrow \bar{y} + 1$

“update the (remote)  $x$  with the current (local)  $x$ , and increment remote  $y$ ”



# AbU execution model



LTS semantics, with judgments:

$$R, \iota \langle \Sigma, \Theta \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} R, \iota \langle \Sigma', \Theta' \rangle$$

A label  $\alpha$  can be:

- an **input** label,  $\text{upd} \blacktriangleright T$
- an **execution** label,  $\text{upd} \triangleright T$
- a **discovery** label,  $T$

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{upd} \in \Theta \quad \text{upd} = (x_1, v_1) \dots (x_k, v_k) \quad \Sigma' = \Sigma[v_1/x_1 \dots v_k/x_k] \quad \Sigma' \models \iota \\
 \Theta'' = \Theta \setminus \{\text{upd}\} \quad X = \{x_i \mid i \in [1..k] \wedge \Sigma(x_i) \neq \Sigma'(x_i)\} \\
 \Theta' = \Theta'' \cup \text{DefUpds}(R, X, \Sigma') \cup \text{LocalUpds}(R, X, \Sigma') \quad T = \text{ExtTasks}(R, X, \Sigma') \\
 \text{(EXEC)} \frac{}{R, \iota \langle \Sigma, \Theta \rangle \xrightarrow{\text{upd} \triangleright T} R, \iota \langle \Sigma', \Theta' \rangle}
 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{upd} \in \Theta \quad \text{upd} = (x_1, v_1) \dots (x_k, v_k) \quad \Sigma' = \Sigma[v_1/x_1 \dots v_k/x_k] \quad \Sigma' \not\models \iota \quad \Theta' = \Theta \setminus \{\text{upd}\} \\
 \text{(EXEC-FAIL)} \frac{}{R, \iota \langle \Sigma, \Theta \rangle \xrightarrow{\text{upd} \triangleright T} R, \iota \langle \Sigma, \Theta' \rangle}
 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
 v_1, \dots, v_k \in \mathbb{V} \quad \Sigma' = \Sigma[v_1/x_1 \dots v_k/x_k] \quad X = \{x_1, \dots, x_k\} \\
 \Theta' = \Theta \cup \text{DefUpds}(R, X, \Sigma') \cup \text{LocalUpds}(R, X, \Sigma') \quad T = \text{ExtTasks}(R, X, \Sigma') \\
 \text{(INPUT)} \frac{}{R, \iota \langle \Sigma, \Theta \rangle \xrightarrow{(x_1, v_1) \dots (x_k, v_k) \blacktriangleright T} R, \iota \langle \Sigma', \Theta' \rangle}
 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \Theta'' = \{[\text{act}] \Sigma \mid \exists i \in [1..n]. \text{task}_i = \varphi : \text{act} \wedge \Sigma \models \varphi\} \quad \Theta' = \Theta \cup \Theta'' \\
 \text{(DISC)} \frac{}{R, \iota \langle \Sigma, \Theta \rangle \xrightarrow{\text{task}_1 \dots \text{task}_n} R, \iota \langle \Sigma, \Theta' \rangle}
 \end{array}$$


$$\text{(STEPL)} \frac{S_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha} S'_1 \quad S_2 \xrightarrow{T} S'_2}{S_1 \parallel S_2 \xrightarrow{\alpha} S'_1 \parallel S'_2} \quad \alpha \in \{\text{upd} \triangleright T, \text{upd} \blacktriangleright T\}$$

$$\text{(STEPR)} \frac{S_1 \xrightarrow{T} S'_1 \quad S_2 \xrightarrow{\alpha} S'_2}{S_1 \parallel S_2 \xrightarrow{\alpha} S'_1 \parallel S'_2} \quad \alpha \in \{\text{upd} \triangleright T, \text{upd} \blacktriangleright T\}$$

- 1 Stability: after an input, does a wave computation always terminates?
- 2 Confluence: will different executions end up with the same state(s)?
- 3 Global invariants: how to guarantee that trajectories will not invalidate a given global property?
- 4 Security: how to avoid information leakages?
- 5 Safety: how to avoid unintended interactions?
- 6 Implementation: how to make it efficient, portable and scalable?
- 7 ...

The wave semantics may exhibit **internal divergence**, namely  $S \xrightarrow{\alpha_0} S^0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} \dots$

ECA  
dependency graph



**rule A**  $r_4(\square) : r_6 \leftarrow \square$

**rule B**  $r_3 r_2(\square) : r_4 \leftarrow \square$

**rule C**  $r_5(\square) : r_6 \leftarrow \square$


**rule D**  $r_1(\square) : r_2 \leftarrow \square$

## Theorem (AbU stabilization)

If the ECA dependency graph of an AbU system  $S$  is acyclic, then  $S$  is stabilizing.

The wave semantics may exhibit **internal divergence**, namely  $S \xrightarrow{\alpha_0} S^0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} \dots$

ECA  
dependency graph



**rule A**  $r_4(\square) : r_6 \leftarrow \square \quad r_1 \leftarrow \square$

**rule B**  $r_3 r_2(\square) : r_4 \leftarrow \square$

**rule C**  $r_5(\square) : r_6 \leftarrow \square$

**rule D**  $r_1(\square) : r_2 \leftarrow \square$


## Theorem (AbU stabilization)

If the ECA dependency graph of an AbU system  $S$  is acyclic, then  $S$  is stabilizing.

Can we do better? E.g., including (some) loops? (Control theory may be useful here?)

The AbU **scheduler** should not influence the AbU semantics: for all  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  such that  $S \rightarrow^* S_1$  and  $S \rightarrow^* S_2$ , there exists  $S'$  such that  $S_1 \rightarrow^* S'$  and  $S_2 \rightarrow^* S'$

labeled ECA  
dependency graph



**rule A**  $r_4 (\square) : r_6 \leftarrow \square$

**rule B**  $r_3 r_2 (\square) : r_4 \leftarrow \square$

**rule C**  $r_5 (\square) : r_6 \leftarrow \square$


**rule D**  $r_1 (\square) : r_2 \leftarrow \square$

## Theorem (AbU confluence)

If for each pair  $(x, y)$  of nodes in the labeled ECA dependency graph of an AbU system  $S$  we have that  $|\text{walks}(x, y)| \leq 1$ , then  $S$  is confluent.

The AbU **scheduler** should not influence the AbU semantics: for all  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  such that  $S \rightarrow^* S_1$  and  $S \rightarrow^* S_2$ , there exists  $S'$  such that  $S_1 \rightarrow^* S'$  and  $S_2 \rightarrow^* S'$

labeled ECA  
dependency graph



**rule A**  $r_4(\square) : r_6 \leftarrow \square \ r_3 \leftarrow \square$

**rule B**  $r_3 \ r_2(\square) : r_4 \leftarrow \square$

**rule C**  $r_5(\square) : r_6 \leftarrow \square$

**rule D**  $r_1(\square) : r_2 \leftarrow \square$


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**Security:** protection of confidential data (by means of *noninterference*)


- Assign different *security levels* to resources: e.g. L (**public**) and H (**confidential**)
- Security policy: No information flow from H to L allowed
- Bisimulation*  $\approx_{h_L}$  that hides L-level updates



for all **L-equivalent states**  $\Sigma_1 \equiv_L \Sigma'_1 \dots \Sigma_n \equiv_L \Sigma'_n$

**Safety:** prevention of **unintended** interactions


- The systems S and R are known to be safe
- Is the ensemble  $S \parallel R$  still safe?
- Bisimulation  $\approx_{hs}$  that hides the updates of S



S does not interact with, or is **transparent** for, R

# Hiding bisimulation

- Weak bisimulation **hiding** labels not related to the requirements
- Parametric on a **function**  $h$  making non-observable labels  $\alpha$  such that  $h(\alpha) = \diamond$



## Security $h_L$ hides:

- discovery labels
- execution labels with H resources

## Safety $h_S$ hides:

- discovery labels
- execution labels produced by S

Algorithm IFRules for computing information flows:




- Compute a **constancy analysis** for conditions and expressions
- Check **explicit** flows for the default action
- Check explicit and **implicit** flows for the task action

## Theorem (Soundness for Security)

If  $\text{IFRules}(R) = \text{false}$  then  $R$  is noninterferent, namely  $R$  is secure.

- Compute **sinks**: resources that rules may update
- Compute **sources**: resources that may influence rules behavior


Check that the sinks of S does not overlap with the sources of R



## Theorem (Soundness for Safety)

If  $\text{sinks}(S) \cap \text{sources}(R) = \emptyset$  then S is transparent for R.

# A (modular) distributed implementation



- ECA rules engine module: AbU semantics
- Device drivers module: abstraction of physical resources
- Distribution module: abstraction of send/receive and cluster nodes join/leave

```

1 # AbU devices definition.
2
3 hvac : "An HVAC control system" {
4     physical output boolean heating = false
5     physical output boolean condit = false
6     logical integer temp = 0
7     logical integer humidity = 0
8     physical input boolean airButton
9     logical string node = "hvac"
10    where not (condit and heating == true)
11 } has cool warm dry stopAir
12
13 tempSens : "A temperature sensor" {
14     physical input integer temp
15     logical string node = "tempSens"
16 } has notifyTemp
17
18 humSens : "A humidity sensor" {
19     physical input integer humidity
20     logical string node = "humSens"
21 } has notifyHum

```


```

22 \%
23     AbU (ECA) rules definition.
24     Rules can be referenced by multiple devices.
25     \%
26
27 rule cool on temp
28     for (this.temp < 18) do this.heating = true
29
30 rule warm on temp
31     for (this.temp > 27) do this.heating = false
32
33 rule dry on humidity; temp
34     for (this.temp * 0.14 < this.humidity)
35         do this.condit = true
36
37 rule stopAir on airButton
38     for (this.airButton) do this.condit = false
39
40 rule notifyTemp on temp
41     for all (ext.node == "hvac")
42         do ext.temp = this.temp

```

[M. Pasqua, M. Comuzzo, MM., IEEE Access 2022]

# AbU-lang Programs Compilation Cycle





### AbU: attribute-based memory updates programming

- Simple to use (ECA paradigm)
- Suitable for the IoT domain
- Strongly decentralized
- Local nodes coordination
- Supports several verification techniques

### Thanks for the attention

- M Miculan, M Pasqua, *A Calculus for Attribute-based Memory Updates*, Proc. ICTAC 2021 - LNCS 12819;
- M Pasqua, M Miculan, *On the Security and Safety of AbU Systems*, International Conference on Software Engineering and Formal Methods, LNCS 13085, 2021.
- M Pasqua, M Miculan, *Distributed Programming of Smart Systems with Event-Condition-Action Rules*, ICTCS 2022: 201-206
- M Pasqua, M Comuzzo, M Miculan, *The AbU Language: IoT Distributed Programming Made Easy*, IEEE Access 10: 132763-132776 (2022)
- M Pasqua, M Miculan, *AbU: A calculus for distributed event-driven programming with attribute-based interaction*. TCS 958: 113841 (2023)
- <https://github.com/abu-lang>